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Abstract 
Carbon dioxide emissions are the main cause of anthropogenic climate change and play a 
central role in discussions on climate change mitigation. Previous research has demonstrated 
that national carbon dioxide emissions are driven mainly by population size and wealth. 
However, the variation in per capita emissions of nations with similar standards of living and 
similar population is huge. In this paper we investigate the drivers of national per capita carbon 
dioxide emissions over and above already known factors. In particular, we extend previous 
research by taking into account countries’ shares of imports and exports, indicators of political 
interventions such as energy prices, and the use of renewable energy sources. Moreover, we 
also examine whether international commitments, such as the ones made by many nations at 
climate summits of the United Nations, matter. We use country-level data from 1980 to 2014 
and estimate fixed effects panel regression models. In accordance with former research we find 
no environmental Kuznets curve with respect to carbon dioxide per capita emission levels. 
However, higher energy prices and the availability of alternative energy sources both reduce 
emissions. Furthermore, voluntary international environmental commitments also motivate 
countries to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. 
 
Keywords: Environmental Sociology, CO2 Emissions, Environmental Kuznets Curve, IPAT, 
STIRPAT, Global Environmental Behavior 
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1. Introduction 
 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are the main cause of global warming and play the central role 
in discussions on climate change mitigation. According to an estimate by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), if global warming is to stay within the two-degree target, the 
atmosphere can absorb approximately 30 Gt of anthropogenic CO2 yearly (Friedlingstein et al. 
2014; IPCC 2014; Meinshausen et al. 2009). Given that the world population will increase to 
approximately 10 billion by 2050 (UN 2015) the two-degree target would allow an emission of 
3 tons per person and year. In 2014 the world average per person was 5.1 tons. However, the 
variation in CO2 emissions is huge. The average emission in the USA is about 16.5 tons, in the 
European Union 6.7 tons, in India 1.8 tons, and in Africa (excluding South Africa) less than 
one ton (Olivier et al. 2015). Given the IPAT formula according to which environmental impact 
is a function of the population, affluence, and technology (Commoner et al. 1971; Ehrlich and 
Holdren 1970, 1971), differences in per capita emissions between countries of different living 
standards are no surprise. However, inspection of country rankings (see Figure 1) reveal that 
the variation is also large between countries with similar living standards such as the USA and 
Europe, and even between similar countries in Europe such as Germany and Switzerland. Given 
the enormous challenge the world is facing to reduce CO2 emissions, insight into the factors 
that are driving emission levels is crucial. So far research has focused on the role of population 
and wealth and some aspects of the economic structure. In this paper we investigate additional 
reasons that might be linked to CO2 emissions. Much discussion has recently been devoted to 
the question of how economic imports and exports are related to CO2 emissions. Thus, the 
emissions of China are often thought to be high because China is viewed as the production site 
of the world with high export rates. However, our analysis shows that export rates of different 
nations bear surprisingly little relation to CO2 emissions. Furthermore, we are interested in 
scrutinizing the effect of policies such as the taxing of gasoline prices and other fossil energy 
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sources, and of supporting non-fossil energy. Moreover, we pay attention to the effects of 
international environmental agreements such as those made at the world climate summits. 
These summits are often criticized for delivering only voluntary commitments but no 
enforceable obligations (Carraro and Siniscalco 1998; Young 2010). However, and maybe 
surprisingly, our analysis shows that even voluntary commitments without enforceable laws 
have some effects on national CO2 levels.  
 
This contribution proceeds in four further steps. In the next section, we present the latest data 
with respect to national CO2 emission levels. The descriptive results are interesting since 
national per capita emissions change rapidly, and country rankings based on it change 
accordingly. Hence, we present data for 1990 (the Kyoto bench line) and 2014. The third section 
describes the data and the statistical model. The fourth section presents the results. We first 
discuss and replicate former studies that explain national CO2 levels. We use the latest available 
data containing 183 countries overall with yearly reported CO2 levels starting in 1980 through 
2014 provided by the Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) (Olivier 
et al. 2015). Because of its longitudinal structure the data is suitable for investigating the causal 
structure of some key variables by calculating fixed effects estimates. We then extend the model 
by incorporating new variables into the analysis, which have been discussed lately in relation 
to CO2 levels such as the extent of foreign trade, or energy prices (Dietz et al. 2010; Jorgenson 
and Clark 2011; Rosa and Dietz 2012; Rosa et al. 2015). Moreover, we integrate indicators of 
political commitment such as the number of international voluntary agreements a country has 
signed and set into force in order to protect the environment. Finally, the main results are 
summarized and discussed in the last section.  
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2. Drivers of CO2 emissions 
 
According to the latest report from EDGAR, worldwide CO2 emissions have reached 35.7 Gt 
in 2014 (Olivier et al. 2015). Dividing this number by the estimated world population of 
approximately 7 billion people amounts to a global average of roughly 5.1 tons of CO2 
emissions per person per year. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates 
that the atmosphere can absorb an additional 1000 Gt of accumulated CO2 until the end of the 
century in order to meet the two-degree goal of global warming with a probability of 66%. 
Given that 40% of CO2 stays in the atmosphere (the other 60% is absorbed by plants, soil and 
oceans) and that the world population will increase to 10 billion (UN 2015), emissions per 
capita should not exceed roughly 3 tons of CO2 emissions per capita and year in order to be 
sustainable.  
 
Currently, CO2 emissions per capita (p.c.) are highest in countries such as Qatar (39 tons p.c.), 
Kuwait (28 tons p.c.), Trinidad and Tobago (25 tons p.c.), and Luxembourg (19 tons p.c.). At 
the very bottom of the world ranking are countries such as Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, and Eritrea where the per capita consumptions of fossil energy sources are almost 
zero and in which emissions are estimated to be around 100 kg per capita. However, the 
measurement at the very top and the very bottom of such a world ranking is biased and/or 
unreliable. In terms of population size the countries with the highest emissions (Qatar, Kuwait, 
Trinidad and Tobago, or Luxembourg) are all very small and are oil-producing (with the 
exception of Luxembourg), and at the bottom of the list they are very poor with notoriously 
unreliable data (Andres et al. 2012). Hence, a meaningful analysis should treat the small oil-
producing states at the very top and the poor countries at the bottom of the distribution as 
statistical outliers. Therefore, our ranking (see Figure 1) starts with Australia, Saudi Arabia, 
and the United States, which have per capita emissions of about 17 tons each. Other large 
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players are the Russian Confederates (12.4 tons), Japan (10.1 tons), the European Union (6.7), 
and China, which reached 7.6 tons per capita in 2014. In comparison the average emissions in 
Brazil, India or Africa are only 2.5, 1.8, and 1.2 tons respectively.  
 
The differences displayed in Figure 1 raise the question of what is causing them. Past research 
has focused on the famous IPAT formula (Commoner et al. 1971; Ehrlich and Holdren 1970, 
1971), which specifies that the environmental impact of a country is a function of population 
size, wealth, and technology. The basic assumptions of the IPAT formula and its statistical 
interpretation (STIRPAT) have been confirmed by older studies using cross sectional data 
analysis (Dietz and Rosa 1997; Rosa et al. 2004; York et al. 2003) as well as by more recent 
studies that use methodologically more advanced statistical methods exploiting the longitudinal 
data structure (Cole and Neumayer 2004; Jorgenson et al. 2014; Liddle 2015; Poumanyvong 
and Kaneko 2010). Newest results from the latter line of research estimate that a one percent 
increase in population increases the per capita CO2 emissions by roughly 1%.1 Additionally, a 
one percent increase in wealth (measured by the purchasing power parity (PPP) of GDP per 
capita) increases CO2 emissions in the range of 0.57 to 0.97 (Liddle 2015). Furthermore, some 
prior studies incorporate the energy intensity of the industrial sector and the share of non-fossil 
fuels of energy production as indicators of a country’s technology. As energy intensity increases 
by one percent per GDP of output (measuring higher inefficiency) CO2 emissions increase by 
0.31 percent, and CO2 is reduced if a country has a larger proportion of non-fossil energy 
production (Liddle 2015). Hence, also new results using longitudinal statistical analysis confirm 
the assumptions specified by the IPAT formula that population, wealth, and technology are the 
important drivers of national CO2 emissions.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1 See Liddle (2014) for a detailed review of demographic factors on CO2 emissions.    
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Figure 1: CO2 emissions per capita in international comparison for 1990 and 2014 
 
Note: The figure shows the top 10 and the bottom 10 countries with respect to CO2 emissions 
p.c. Excluded are some very small countries from the top and some very poor countries from 
the bottom of the distribution. Data Source is the Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric 
Research (Olivier et al. 2015).  
 
3. Data and Method 
 
For our statistical analyses we compiled data from newest available sources (see Table S1 in 
the supplement for a complete description of all variables). Most importantly, we used the 
Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR), which contains yearly 
information on CO2 emissions from 1970 to 2014 for 183 countries. However, country numbers 
are reduced due to missing data in some covariates or due to statistical outliers (see Table S2 in 
the supporting information for a list of countries included in the analyses). In comparison to 
other data, EDGAR has the advantage of containing the most recent years, and includes 
emissions from industrial processes. Thus, the data is more complete and more accurate than 
the information provided by the International Energy Agency (IEA) (Andres et al. 2012, Olivier 
et al. 2015). Information on countries’ population size is taken from the World Bank (WB). 
Data on GDP (converted into PPP) is obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The IMF data has the advantage of providing PPP GDP information for every country starting 
1980 onwards. In comparison, data from the World Bank starts in 1990 and would restrict the 
observation period to 24 years. Information on the energy intensity required to produce a unit 
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of GDP, fossil fuel consumption, and the share of electricity production from non-fossil sources 
are gathered from the International Energy Agency (IEA). Data on import and export rates and 
information about countries’ GDP share of industry or service is taken from the World Bank 
(WB).  
 
We estimate the effects via a standard fixed effects (FE) panel regression model in which the 
yearly changes of CO2 emissions (from the mean) are regressed on the yearly changes in the 
independent variables (Brüderl and Ludwig 2015; Wooldridge 2010). The model can be written 
as 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖 = (𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝒙𝒙�𝑖𝑖)𝜷𝜷 + 𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖𝜸𝜸 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 −  𝜀𝜀?̅?𝑖. (1) 
 
yit denotes the (natural logarithm of) CO2 per capita of country i in year t.  𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖 denotes the 
countries’ average for the whole observation period. xit denotes the vector of all exogenous 
variables for country i in time t, and 𝒙𝒙�𝑖𝑖 the averages for the whole observation period. Z is a 
vector of dummy variables which controls period effects for all countries. It takes the value of 
one if the observation year is one and zero otherwise for all t ≠ 1. 𝜀𝜀it refers to a country’s time 
varying stochastic error term. For statistical purposes and for ease of interpretation we took the 
natural logarithm of all exogenous variables, except for the number of international 
environmental agreements, which enter latter models in counts in steps of 100. The fixed effects 
model given in (1) has the advantage of taking only the within country variations into account. 
Any unobserved between country differences, therefore, cannot bias the estimation. Under the 
assumption that xit and εit are not correlated (strict exogeneity) a fixed effects model is an 
adequate statistical tool to estimate the unbiased causal effect of the independent variables X 
on Y. The assumption is violated if there are measurement errors in xit, unaccounted period 
effects (external shocks), or omitted variables that are correlated with Y and X. We account for 
possible period effects by including the yearly time dummies (Z) into the analyses.  
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4. Results  
 
We begin our analyses by first replicating former models, who regress the CO2 levels of 
countries on population size, wealth (PPP GDP per capita), energy intensity, and fossil fuel 
consumption (particularly Liddle 2015). Our results (see Model 1 in Table 1) replicate former 
studies rather closely with respect to the effect of population and wealth. Our population 
estimate of 1% suggests that CO2 emissions are simply proportional to population size. A 
quadratic population term (not shown in Table 1) is statistically not significant suggesting that 
there are neither exponential nor marginal decreasing effects of population (for similar results 
see also Jorgenson and Clark 2010). 
 
Proportionality suggests that models of CO2 emissions are better specified by using emissions 
per capita instead of total country level emissions, because this incorporates population into the 
dependent variable and thereby circumvents potential problems of multicollinearity. The results 
of such a model using the CO2 emissions per capita are displayed in Model 2 of Table 1. The 
results suggest that every increase in GDP per capita by 1% increases CO2 emissions by 0.5%. 
The quadratic term of logged GDP is very small and in latter models (Models 3 and 4) not 
statistically significant, suggesting that also we find no environmental Kuznets curve with 
respect to the growth of CO2 per capita emissions like prior studies (Aslanidis and Iranzo 2009; 
Azomahou et al. 2006; Cavlovic et al. 2000; Jorgenson 2012; Jorgenson and Clark 2012; Liddle 
2015; Wagner 2008). Next, we take indicators of technology into account and find in 
comparison to former studies (e.g. Liddle 2015) much stronger effects of the energy intensity 
(Model 2). Thus, a one percent increase in the energy intensity to produce a unit of GDP 
increases CO2 emissions by 1.5 percent, suggesting that technology and foremost efficiency has 
a strong impact on CO2 emissions. 
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Table 1: Country and Time Fixed Effects Regressions of CO2 Emissions (per capita) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variables CO2 CO2 per capita 
Population 1.00***    
 (0.16)    
     
GDP p. c. 0.76*** 0.55*** 0.53*** 0.78*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) 
GDP p. c. squared -0.06*** -0.03* -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Energy Intensity 2.31*** 1.52*** 1.30*** 3.03*** 
 (0.36) (0.28) (0.28) (0.39) 
Fossil Fuel Energy Consumption 0.69*** 0.09 0.10+ 0.28* 
(0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.11) 
     
Foreign Trade   0.04 0.07 
   (0.03) (0.04) 
Industry   0.01 0.24 
   (0.06) (0.20) 
Services   -0.08 0.68+ 
   (0.06) (0.36) 
Electricity Production from Non-Fossil Sources   -0.03+ -0.11** 
  (0.02) (0.03) 
International Environmental Agreements  
(Unit: 100 IEAs) 
  -0.06** -0.10* 
  (0.02) (0.04) 
     
Energy Prices    -0.04* 
    (0.02) 
n x T 3295 3295 2877 596 
n 147 147 116 31 
adjusted R2 within 0.7631 0.5355 0.5850 0.7245 
Root MSE 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.04 
Test for Residual Cross-Section Independence (H0) 1.40 1.00 1.35 1.44 
Residual Non-Stationarity Panel Unit Root Test (H0) 6.48*** 4.775*** 2.46** 2.23* 
 
Notes: + = p < 0.10, * = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001. Unstandardized regression coefficients with 
standard errors in brackets. Models 1 to 4 contain dummy variables for each year in order to control for overall 
time-trends. All standard errors are clustered by country and year, and therefore robust with respect to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The test values of the Residual Cross-Section Independence Test and the 
values of the Residual Non-Stationarity Panel Unit Root Test are standard normally distributed. Thus, values below 
1.96 indicate that H0 cannot be rejected. Hence, the residuals are cross-sectionally independent and stationary 
(homoscedastic without any time trend). Model 4 contains most OECD countries plus Latvia and South Africa. A 
coefficient plot of the results including the 95% confidence intervals is contained in the supplement (Figure S1). 
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This difference in effect size might partly be due to the fact that our data on CO2 emissions 
includes emissions from industrial processes. In comparison, former research only takes 
emissions from fossil fuel use into account and excludes other sources. However, the definition 
of energy intensity is a unit of energy divided by a unit of GDP and the definition of the 
dependent variable is CO2 divided by population. Hence, the two variables are partly linked by 
data construction.  
  
Finally, the model also contains a variable measuring how much of the total energy 
consumption stems from fossil sources. The effect we find is surprisingly weak. Considering 
only the 31 members of the OECD (Model 4) with the most reliable data, a one percent increase 
in the share of energy stemming from fossil fuels increases CO2 emissions just by 0.28 percent.  
 
Next, we are concerned with extending the IPAT formula and the analyses of prior studies by 
taking further possible causes of CO2 intensity into account. One argument often heard in the 
debate is that some developing countries have high emission rates because they have become 
industrial production sites of the world. Hence, CO2 emissions are created in developing 
countries, but the goods are consumed in the affluent nations (so-called Pollution Haven 
Hypothesis) (Chichilnisky 1994; Jorgenson 2012). In particular, China is supposed to have high 
emission rates because of high export rates. However, export rates often go hand-in-hand with 
import rates. In our extension we first incorporated import and export rates separately into the 
model, finding no statistically significant effects (see Table S4 in the supplement). Next, we 
combined import and export rates into a variable measuring the percentage of foreign trade 
relative to a country’s GDP. However, the percentage of foreign trade also does not produce 
any significant result in our model (see Models 3 and 4). Hence, this finding suggests that the 
amount of foreign trade is not an important source of CO2 emissions ceteris paribus (see also 
Jorgenson et al. 2014). This finding can also be demonstrated with regard to China. Figure 2 
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shows that GDP and CO2 per capita have been rising steeply in China since 2005. However, 
both import and export rates have been falling during the same time period. Hence, exports are 
not the main driver of CO2 levels in China (see also Arto and Dietzenbacher 2014). We also 
find no reliable evidence regarding an economy’s share of the industrial or service sector with 
respect to GDP, suggesting that there is no empirical evidence supporting the notion that a shift 
to the service sector goes hand-in-hand with reductions of CO2 per capita.  
 
Figure 2: Comparison of Trends in CO2 Emissions, GDP and Foreign Trade in China 
 
Note: CO2 data sources are the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) for the years 1960 through 
1969 and EDGAR for 1970 to 2014.  
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Following Rosa and Dietz (2012) (see also Rosa et al. 2015) we extend the model further by 
incorporating indicators of environmental policies. Environmental policies can more or less 
directly intervene with regards to energy supply and energy consumption. The supply side is 
often influenced by encouraging (and subsidizing) non-fossil sources such as energy produced 
by solar, water, nuclear, or other renewable sources. We integrated the percentage change in 
energy supply produced by non-fossil sources. As expected the results indicate that every 
increase of one percent reduces the per capita CO2 emissions by 0.11%. The effect is only 
observable in Model 4 (Table 1) controlling for energy prices. This substitution effect of fossil 
fuel by non-fossil fuel sources is surprisingly small. However, the result replicates former 
findings (York 2012). One reason for this might be that renewable energy sources are very 
volatile depending on weather conditions such as wind, sunshine, or water supply. Supposedly, 
high volatility reduces the substitution effect, particularly if storage capacity or smart grids are 
not available.  
 
Countries often indicate their willingness to protect the environment by signing international 
agreements. The most prominent examples in this context are of course the Kyoto Protocol and 
other voluntary international agreements like those made at world climate summits. Another 
recent example is the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic, which was signed by the neighboring countries of the Arctic Sea in 
2013. These summits and agreements are often criticized for not being very successful since 
many agreements are not binding and violations cannot be sanctioned (Carraro and Siniscalco 
1998; Young 2010). Using data from the International Environmental Agreements Database 
Project (IEADP) (Mitchell 2015) we counted all international environmental agreements that 
countries signed and put into force from 1960 to 2014, and incorporated this variable into the 
model. The distribution varies from 90 agreements (Zambia) to 509 (France) and is displayed 
in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3: Cumulated Numbers of International Environmental Agreements 
 
Note: Displayed are the 10 countries at the top and 10 countries at the bottom of the distribution in addition to 
some averages such as for the European Union. 
 
The results indicate that for every 100 additional agreements CO2 emissions indeed decrease 
by about 0.06% respectively 0.10% (see Models 3 and 4 in Table 1). Thus, the effect is relatively 
small but voluntary agreements matter and are an indicator of a nation’s willingness to reduce 
emissions. This result is visualized in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Predicted Marginal Effect of International Environmental Agreements on CO2 
Emissions per Capita (Obtained from Model 3 of Table 1) 
 
Note: Dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval.  
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An often used instrument for reducing emissions is the price mechanism, and many countries 
tax oil and electricity in order to encourage reduction efforts. Internationally comparable energy 
price time series are hard to find in international statistics and are only available for OECD 
countries. This reduces the number of countries for this analysis to 31. The results are displayed 
in Model 4 of Table 1 and show that an increase in energy prices by one percent reduces CO2 
emissions by 0.04 percent. The effect is small and far from proportional. One possible 
interpretation is that the elasticity of the price effect depends on the substitutability of energy. 
Prices are expected to have only small effects if the substitutability is low. This seems to be the 
case for the overall energy demand. A further reason might be that many energy prices, 
particularly the oil price, are volatile. High volatility makes it hard for consumers to adapt 
persistently to energy reducing life styles. However, the results still suggest, that price increases 
are contributing to reductions in CO2 emission levels. 
 
We performed a number of robustness checks for the models in Table 1. First, we calculated all 
models by allowing for country-specific constants and slopes (FEIS models) (see Brüderl and 
Ludwig 2015; Wooldridge 2010; Polachek and Kim 1994). This extension did not refine the 
results in any substantial way. Second, we deleted the upper and lower 5% of countries with 
respect to the CO2 emissions and PPP GDP per capita in order to control for statistical outliers. 
Additionally, all models were recalculated by dropping one country each time from the 
regression. Separately, we also excluded countries with less than 10 observations. None of these 
checks had any substantial influence on our estimates. Furthermore, all parameters were tested 
for linearity, including penalized splines two-way (country and time) FE models (Ruppert et al. 
2003). The partial residual plot for GDP is shown in the supplement (Figure S2). In addition, 
we checked the robustness of standard errors via non-parametric bootstrapping and found no 
substantial differences. Moreover, we conducted subgroup-specific analyses with regard to 
OECD membership and non-membership (see Table S5 in the supplement), and with respect to 
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different world regions as defined by the World Bank (Europe and Central Asia, Latin America 
and Caribbean, Middle East and Africa, South East Asia and Pacific). Subgroup specific 
analysis was also performed with respect to the geographical position of countries (tropical and 
non-tropical regions). None of these variations led to essentially different results. Also, we 
substituted the overall energy intensity as shown in Table 1 by the industrial energy intensity 
(taken from the IEA). Lastly, all models were estimated by using CO2 data from CDIAC, and 
GDP data from Penn World Table 8.1. None of these variations leads to different conclusions. 
All models presented in Table 1 as well as all the robustness checks were conducted using the 
statistical software package STATA 14.1.  
 
5. Summary and Discussion 
 
This paper investigates the determinants of national CO2 emissions per capita by using more 
extensive and more accurate data sources than prior studies. The analyses are based on 147 
countries for which yearly measurements of CO2 per capita and various covariates exist for the 
period between 1980 and 2014. We analyze the data using fixed effects panel regression 
models. Such models avoid cross-sectional comparisons, which are often biased due to 
unobserved heterogeneity between the countries. First, we replicate former studies (particularly 
Liddle 2015) and show that a country’s population size is proportionally related to CO2 
emissions. Therefore, CO2 per capita becomes our dependent variable. Second, our analyses 
suggest that the growth of wealth (GDP per capita) is mostly linearly related to growth in CO2 
emissions. Moreover, the estimated elasticity 0.5 means that the absolute emissions are 
marginally decreasing at higher levels of GDP.  
 
Besides these replications our paper offers some new and interesting findings. First, we find 
that a shift from the industrial sector to the service sector is not related to reductions in CO2 
 16 
emissions as is often assumed (e.g. Fourcroy et al. 2012). Second, we show that the share of 
foreign trade does not determine CO2 levels. This result is surprising since the literature often 
hypothesizes that some developing countries (e.g. China) have high emission levels because 
they have become the workbench for more affluent countries. Third, we incorporate countries’ 
political effort by taking the number of international environmental commitments into account. 
Our results suggest that countries that have signed many international agreements have indeed 
reduced emission levels as compared to those that signed fewer agreements. Hence, 
international voluntary commitments matter. Finally, we also take national price levels into 
account and show that higher energy prices reduce CO2 emission levels.  
 
The most surprising result is the finding that voluntary agreements matter. However, this does 
not imply that voluntary agreements are sufficient to meet the international goal of limiting 
climate change to 1.5 or 2 degrees. Assuming that the world population will reach roughly 10 
billion by the middle of the century and given that the atmosphere of the earth can cope with 
roughly 30 Gt of CO2 emissions the sustainable per capita emission is about 3 tons per year. 
Certainly most industrialized countries exceed 3 tons per capita extensively. Even the most 
sustainable countries in Europe (e.g. France, or Switzerland) still have emission levels of about 
5 tons per capita and would need a reduction of around 40% to become sustainable with respect 
to greenhouse gas emissions. Reduction levels of 40% are still very ambitious but appear 
feasible. Other countries such as the USA, Australia or Canada have emission levels of about 
16 or 17 tons and would therefore need reductions of about 80%. Hence, many countries have 
a long way to go and will have to take ambitious measures in order to keep the 2-degree goal. 
Voluntary agreements which are not binding and which will not cause sanctions if missed will 
probably be not sufficient.  
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